Ozone and climate governance: an implausible path dependence by Grundmann, Reiner
 1 
Ozone and climate governance: an implausible path dependence  
 
Reiner Grundmann 
 
Several commentators have emphasized the success of the Montreal Protocol and its 
significance for other global environmental problems, most notably climate change (e.g. 
Tolba 2008). This raises the interesting question to what extent the cases of ozone layer 
depletion and climate change are similar. Climate change, and greenhouse gases (most 
notably CO2) have been a topic of scientific investigation at least since the 19th century. 
Climate science proper commenced in the 1960s with the merging of two disciplines, carbon 
cycle research and climate modelling (Hart and Victor 1993). Observations of global CO2 
concentrations started in 1958, and global average temperatures hundred years before 
that. Politically, it was put on the international agenda at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted by all member states of 
the UN. Article 2 of the convention states that its ‘ultimate objective’ is the ‘stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’ The text continues as follows: ‘Such a 
level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt 
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.’  
 
While this text of the convention was not binding on the signatories, the 1997 Kyoto 
protocol established as binding goal an average 5% reduction of ‘anthropogenic carbon 
dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases below 1990 levels in the commitment 
period 2008 to 2012.’ After a failure to agree on new terms in Copenhagen 2009, the Paris 
accord of 2015 has agreed that countries should stay within a 1.5 – 2 degree limit by the end 
of the century. No reduction targets or timetables were announced, and the main 
mechanism of achieving the target is through ‘pledge and review’, i.e. voluntary climate 
policies by individual countries, with a view to make them more stringent over time. 
 
The ozone layer has been thematised in science since the 1930s, but studies in stratospheric 
ozone science began only in the early 1970s, starting with Harold Johnsons’s works on NOx 
emissions from supersonic aircraft, Jim Lovelocks’s measurements of CFCs at sea level in the 
atmosphere and then of course with the publication of the seminal paper by Rowland and 
Molina (Molina and Rowland 1974). First in situ measurements in the stratosphere were 
conducted in the 1930s  and some ozone sounding records date back to the 1960s 
(Hofmann 2009), but most in situ measurements in the stratosphere were widely 
undertaken from the 1980s.  Measurements of CFCs in the troposphere were first 
performed by Lovelock in 1971 (Lovelock, Maggs, and Wade 1973).  
 
In policy terms, a milestone was reached with the Vienna convention in 1985 which ‘urge[d] 
all States and regional economic integration organizations … to control their emissions of 
CFCs, inter alia in aerosols, by any means at their disposal, including controls on production 
or use, to the maximum extent practicable.’ The Montreal Protocol of 1987 and the 
subsequent amendments led to a phasing out of ozone depleting substances (ODS) by the 
end of the 20th century. 
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One is bound to ask why ozone layer protection was a latecomer in science and politics, yet 
led to a swift political response. On the other hand, one asks why climate change and the 
role of GHGs was a longstanding topic in science, but has not led to a similar effective 
political resolution to date.  
 
I will begin my paper with an examination of the similarities and differences between the 
two cases. In order to explain the difference between the two cases I will then (section 2) 
introduce the concept of the linear model of the science policy nexus; and in of tame and 
wicked problems (section 3). The last section will discuss the political options that were 
deemed relevant in both cases.  
 
Similarities 
 
The similarities between ozone layer depletion and climate change can be summarized in 
the following list.  
 
Ozone depleting substances and greenhouse gases (GHGs, esp. CO2) have a long lifetime. In 
both cases these stretch to several decades. This means that ODPs and GHGs accumulate in 
the atmosphere, making potential effects worse over time. Any delay in action makes 
problem worse in the future.  
 
ODPs and GHGs are emitted locally but diffuse globally. No matter where on Earth these 
gases are produced and emitted, they will mix in the air, travel around the globe and cause 
impacts that will again be felt locally. Both problems therefore have a local and global 
dimension.  
 
In both cases societal stakeholders resist regulation. This was evident with the relevant 
parts of the chemical industry, resisting CFC regulation from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1980s. A similar activity can be observed with regard to fossil fuel lobby groups in the case 
of climate change. However, the range of potential ‘veto players’ includes many more actors 
in the case of climate change because GHGs are much more central to the economic 
functioning of the world economy. 
 
The role of science is a salient feature in both cases. We distinguish between individual 
scientists and science as an institutional setting for collecting evidence. Individual scientists 
have been active in both cases. Rowland, Molina, Crutzen and others became advocates for 
the banning of CFCs. Their activities included public appearances in the media and in front 
of parliamentary committees, giving testimony. Similar activism has emerged in the case of 
climate change, arguably starting with James Hansen’s statement to Congress in 1988. 
These scientists have been vocal and alerted the world public to potential dangers.  
 
Science as an institution has provided research results through publications, conferences, 
and also through assessment reports. In the case of ozone research these reports were 
initiated in 1985 by the WMO and UNEP and provided an assessment of the available 
knowledge. In 1988 a similar mechanism was established for climate research through the 
IPCC (Grundmann 2001; Skodvin 2000; Weart 2003). As we shall see, there are different 
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interpretations about the relevance and effectiveness of these assessments for the policy 
process. 
 
 
 
Differences 
 
Turning to the difference between both cases, several aspects stand out. In the case of 
ozone, several drivers of ozone were identified of which manmade ODS were seen as 
crucial. Natural drivers were also known, such as large volcanic eruptions which were 
thought to inject large amounts of chlorine into the atmosphere. But these were seen as 
sporadic events, and the amount of chlorine rising to the stratosphere was uncertain (WMO 
1985:114). In policy terms, the framing of the issue was about ODS, and initially nearly 
exclusively on CFCs. 
 
While CFCs were industrially produced, many climate drivers exist naturally. It is true that 
much of GHG emissions are by-products of industrial processes, or of human activities more 
generally. But the existence of the carbon cycle means that we, as humankind, are always 
embedded in a process of producing and capturing CO2. The anthropogenic component can 
be enhanced or reduced, but not eliminated. Even before the advent of industrialization, 
human societies were able to affect the carbon cycle via modification of biomass, for 
example (Erb et al. 2017). 
 
Drivers of climate change include other processes, such as methane, N2O, soot, HFCs, and 
many more. Some of these are relatively short lived which allows for policy interventions 
aiming at quick gains in mitigation. Their relative importance is discussed in IPCC AR5 WG1, 
chapter 8 (Myhre et al. 2013). This shows that CO2 is the most important one in the long 
run.  
 
Another important difference is the fact that CFCs were a relatively small part of global 
economic activity, and their production was located in a small number of countries. As 
Falkner (2009:259) put it, ‘five chemical firms (DuPont, Allied Chemical, Hoechst, ICI and 
Atochem) in four countries (the US, Germany, Britain and France) dominated global CFC 
production’. Only a few developing countries started hosting small CFC plants.  
 
In contrast, climate drivers are associated with the industrial infrastructures of societies, 
through energy production, housing, manufacturing, agriculture, or transport. All countries 
are part of these infrastructures and activities. Our way of living depends on activities that 
impact on climate. Compared to ozone, the challenge for politics is bigger by several orders 
of magnitude. In the ozone case substitutes for different applications were becoming 
available at low cost, and the disruption to economic activities was minimal. Conversely, the 
cost of decarbonisation is high, especially if climate sensitivity is high (Wagner and 
Zeckhauser 2016). There is no agreement on the likely equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS). 
The IPCC in its fifth assessment report wrote that ‘there is high confidence that ECS is 
extremely unlikely less than 1°C and medium confidence that the ECS is likely between 1.5°C 
and 4.5°C and very unlikely greater than 6°C.’ Depending on which value one assumes, the 
problem could be seen from being minimal to catastrophic. 
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The communication of the problem was different in both cases. The endangered ozone layer 
was initially framed as one of long term depletion, of a fabric which becomes threadbare. 
This changed in 1986 when the alarmed discovery of abnormal low ozone over Antarctica 
led to the reframing of the problem as ozone hole, which added urgency to the definition 
and perception of the problem (Grevsmühl 2017). The ozone hole focussed attention of 
policymakers, especially as it came completely unexpected. Climate change does not have 
one focussing device, there many symbols that are deployed to alert people, such a pictures 
of belching chimneys, floods, draughts, rain forests, or extreme weather events. None of 
these is unexpected, and the shocks have already been anticipated. Should the West 
Antarctic ice shelf drift into the sea this would have been thematised over decades. What is 
more, climate change has been linked to other, sometimes far-fetched or implausible 
events, such as volcanic activity, earthquakes, obesity, violent conflict (Koubi 2017), or 
migration from refugees in Northern Africa (Missirian and Schlenker 2017). 
 
The linear model of policy making 
 
There is a widespread belief that scientific information will impact policy making and that 
there is a natural flow from knowledge to action. Countless studies have proven this not to 
be the case (Collingridge and Reeve 1986; Grundmann and Stehr 2012; Jasanoff 1990), but 
the idea persists, as hope, or as myth, or as wishful thinking. However, our comparator 
cases show interesting differences when it comes to the role of scientific knowledge in the 
policy making process. Let us look at both in turn. 
 
Official accounts of the success in Montreal point to the unified assessments as key 
explanation. Such accounts suggest that only because science was able to ‘speak with one 
voice’ that sceptical voices could be side-lined (Benedick 1998; Haas 1992; Tolba 2008). 
Some go as far as describing science in the ‘driving seat’. Perhaps the most important 
scientific information about long-term ozone depletion (which was, after all, the remit of 
the Montreal Protocol) was the report by Ozone Trends Panel published in 1988, one year 
after the meeting of the parties in Montreal (WMO 1988). However, this report presented a 
consensus about the observation of globally declining ozone concentrations without 
providing a consensus on the causes (see also Litfin 1994).  
 
Apart from the scientific insights, pragmatic solutions and technical innovations played a 
major part on the way to Montreal. First of all, there was a partial ban on CFC use enacted 
in 1977 in the USA (the so-called ‘Spray can ban’). This was advocated early on by scientists 
like Rowland, and propagated by the press. Consumers followed suit by preferring CFC free 
products. These were provided by companies without major difficulties (roll-on deodorants, 
pump spray cans, butane spray cans, etc., see also Parson 2003). 
 
The USA spray can ban, enacted through the Clean Air Act, had an impact on the CFC 
producers in the US which led to complaints by US industry. Their argument was that 
European producers gained an unfair advantage on the world market and that a level 
playing field needed to be restored. This was an important argument in the negotiating 
process towards Montreal. The US government, and its industry, wanted to turn this early 
disadvantage into a competitive advantage. This may explain why US CFC producers came to 
 5 
reassess their position towards CFC controls from 1986 onwards, whereas European CFC 
producers were still resisting regulations, citing scientific uncertainties. 
 
In the case of climate change something different can be seen. First of all, there is more 
scientific activity and more measurements of critical substances have been carried out. We 
do have long term time series of CO2 concentrations and global average temperature levels, 
and efforts at quantifying the role of the former on the latter. However, despite the IPCC 
and its efforts at mobilizing the science consensus, dissonant voices have not disappeared, 
and the consensus pertains to minimalist statements such as those that observed 
temperature increases are most likely the result of human activities (Cook et al. 2013; 
Pearce et al. 2017). There is no consensus on the likely climate sensitivity which would be an 
important piece of information in order to calculate future costs and benefits. The potential 
impacts of warming, and of climate change, are wide-ranging. It seems to be fair to say that 
science, and the IPCC, have been successful in putting the problem on the political agenda, 
without being able or willing to design policy. After all, the IPCC, according to its own 
description, is providing policy relevant knowledge, without being policy prescriptive (IPCC 
2010). 
 
Meanwhile, the policy process had developed so-called No-regret policies ever since the oil 
crisis, at least in some European countries. This has led to more fuel-efficient cars and more 
energy efficient infrastructures and housing. But such efforts were not enough to keep 
temperatures below 2 degrees Celsius in the long run. Other policies have been added, and 
numeric mitigation targets have been established, mainly in Europe.  
 
In recent years some fast developing countries have been emitting more GHGs than 
developed countries. China has overtaken the US in total annual emissions of CO2 (but not 
in historic emissions, and not per capita). This poses problems in international negotiations. 
Unlike the ozone treaty, where developing countries did not play a role, with climate we see 
an involvement of all countries which makes agreement more difficult. 
 
In both cases the linear model of policy making is a myth. Many actors apart from science 
have shaped the definition of the problem, and the potential strategies to address it. Issues 
of economic burden sharing are prominent, among others, both on the domestic and 
international level. 
 
Tame and wicked problems 
 
Apart from the difficulties posed at the level of international negotiations there is a more 
fundamental issue we need to address. This is the question of what kind of problem we are 
facing in the case of ozone depletion, and in the case of climate change. Are both problems 
that can be solved? Much of the language used to describe ozone and climate is the same in 
that it employs the figure of ‘solving the problem’. Scholars in urban policy have alerted us 
to the fact there are some problems, mainly in urban policy, and to do with social policy 
issues, that are resistant to solution. Rittel & Webber (1973) distinguish between tame and 
wicked problems. Tame problems are problems which have a unique, and clearly 
identifiable solution. Think of solving an equation; or achieving checkmate in five moves 
against your opponent. In such cases we know what the solution looks like, and if we have 
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solved the problem. Wicked problems are problems that escape this logic. Success criteria 
are unclear, contested, and subject to change over time. Examples include crime, education, 
health, economy, employment, and so on. Policies are developed to manage the problem, 
but there is no hope that we could solve these issues, once and for all. What we try to do is 
to manage these problems. A lot of political dispute is about the definition, and re-definition 
of these problems. There is no expectation that science can provide a solution. Steps are 
taken incrementally and pragmatically.  
 
The distinction between tame and wicked problems lends itself to a straightforward 
application to our two cases (Grundmann 2016). Put simply, and somewhat provocatively, 
ozone layer protection is a tame problem, climate change a wicked problem. In the ozone 
case, there were two political options from the outset: do nothing (wait and see); or 
regulate ODS. The benchmark of success was a return to pre-industrial levels of chlorine 
loading in the atmosphere. The Montreal Protocol has provided the roadmap to achieve 
this. Part of the regulatory framework is the Technology and Economic Assessment Panel 
(TEAP) which “provides… technical information related to the alternative technologies that 
have been investigated and employed to make it possible to virtually eliminate use of Ozone 
Depleting Substances (such as CFCs and Halons), that harm the ozone layer.” (UNEP Ozone 
Secretariat n.d.). 
 
The ozone layer shows signs of recovery but the job is not done (Solomon et al. 2016). It is 
an open question when this will be achieved. Should the recovery come to a halt or go into 
reverse this would be an indication that other factors are at play, that the chlorine 
chemistry of the atmosphere is not well understood, and the tame problem could unravel 
into a wicked one. 
 
Contrast this case to climate change. There are different metrics that could be used to 
gauge success. Three important metrics are: (1) limiting warming to under 2 degrees Celsius 
(or even to under 1.5 degrees, which would make a big difference) by the end of the 
century. This would require (2) to keep CO2 concentrations below a certain threshold and to 
(3) emit only a specified amount of CO2 over this period (Aykut and Dahan 2011). In order 
to achieve these goals global carbon budgets have been calculated (Rogelj et al. 2016). The 
size of the budget varies by large amounts depending on the methods and scenarios on 
which calculations are based (Millar et al. 2017; Rogelj et al. 2014).  
 
A sign of success would be that the temperature rise over the coming decades will be 
limited to a specified amount. Likewise, we would expect a stabilization of CO2 
concentrations in the atmosphere at some safe level. In order to get there, we would need a 
radical reduction in CO2 emissions. Unlike the ozone case where a phase out of, and a ban 
on CFCs was feasible, no such option exists in climate change. Trying to reduce CO2 
emissions radically, and quickly, runs counter to resistance from societal stakeholders, since 
CO2 has a central place in the economic structure of society (Pielke Jnr. 2010).   
 
It is noteworthy that no one in the climate change debate has suggested the policy goal of 
reversing back to pre-industrial levels of CO2. Ambitious plans aim at stabilizing CO2 
concentrations to between 400-500ppm, compared to 280ppm concentrations before the 
industrial era. The most ‘radical’ positions talk about ‘getting below’ 350ppm (Hansen et al. 
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2008; https://350.org). Some commentators perceive the crossing of this level as a ‘tipping 
point’ (Rockström et al. 2009). There is no agreement on what level of CO2 concentration is 
a safe level. 
 
There is the distinct possibility that the target of 1.5-degree or 2-degree warming will be 
missed (Geden 2016). Would this mean that we have failed to solve the problem of 
(anthropogenic) climate change? From our present position, it certainly would. However, by 
2100 scientists or policy makers might well argue that despite the warming we have seen, 
this is far from dangerous, or that the dangers can be addressed. And even an overshoot 
that had been deemed dangerous would not necessarily mean that we will give up on the 
problem. One might expect people saying that certain attempts have failed, but that there 
are still other policies available. The problem would be re-defined. As before, we would 
make choices between options that appear better or worse. These policies will include more 
radical approaches, as discussed in the next section. 
 
There are two aspects arising from the previous discussion that need highlighting. One is 
that in the ozone case scientific and technical knowledge was available, and able, to 
prescribe policy, once the question of ODS controls had been resolved. With a regulatory 
framework in place, all policy efforts could be channelled in the direction of reducing 
manmade chemicals that harm stratospheric ozone, as far and as quickly as possible. 
Secondly, in the case climate change several attempts and metrics of dealing with the 
problem exist but none can be seen as a solution in the strict sense. Climate change is a 
problem that will stay with us. This is not to say that nothing can be done to make climate 
change impacts less serious. But such attempts do not amount to a solution of the problem 
in the strict sense of the term. 
 
Policy options 
 
The above assumes that scientifically defined benchmarks, goals or targets are useful for 
policy-making. But achieving these goals means to change social, economic and 
technological practices. Staying within certain carbon budgets will lead to political disputes 
about how best to achieve them (and to disputes about the veracity of the underlying 
science). The suggested carbon metrics is not apt to solve political disagreement, or to 
sidestep it. Such disagreement becomes obvious when considering strategies to address 
causes and impacts of climate change. Consider the following list of twelve policy options: 
 
1. rolling out nuclear power plants across the globe; 
2. switching all energy supply to solar, wind or biofuels; 
3. taxing carbon (or energy) with a) low or b) high rates;  
4. implementing emission trading systems;  
5. developing carbon capture and storage technologies; 
6. develop new zero carbon energy systems; 
7. taking adaptation more seriously; 
8. developing geo-engineering projects;  
9. adopting vegetarian or vegan diets and lifestyles;  
10. restricting population growth; 
11. abolishing capitalism; 
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12. abolishing democracy.  
 
Some of the suggestions go together, many contradict each other. Observers have pointed 
out that some of these solutions might be worse than the problem (Biello 2010; full 
disclosure: The author of this paper is on record of recommending a combination of 3a and 
6, see Prins et al. 2010).  
 
The green movement has split over the issue if nuclear is the best option we have, given 
that a massive expansion of renewable energy technologies would occupy a lot of land 
(Porritt 2011; Shellenberger 2017).  
 
Direct carbon capture technologies are unproven at scale, solar radiation management 
poses numerous legal, ethical and political problems (Hulme 2014; Keith 2013; Ming et al. 
2014). Likewise, land use changes under BECCS scenarios could have problematic effects 
(Erb et al. 2017). 
 
Carbon taxes are a simple tool, yet politically divisive. Especially hopes in high taxes are 
misplaced. Making carbon unaffordable for significant parts of the electorate will not be 
achievable. Policies that increase fuel (and energy) poverty are politically regressive 
(Giddens 2009). 
 
Emission trading systems have a poor record so far. There are massive problems with 
setting an efficient carbon price, and the trading systems are being used for fraudulent 
activities.  (Berta, Gautherat, and Gun 2017).  
 
Developing zero carbon energy systems would provide an obvious technological platform 
that would help achieving GHG reductions. They would do nothing about other climate 
drivers (such as those in agriculture and forestry) and do not come about on their own. 
Radically new technologies need huge upfront investment and need time to develop, both 
drawbacks on their appeal. The state would need to play a major role, as has been 
documented in other cases (Mazzucato 2011). In its way stand 40 years of neo-liberal 
political rhetoric.  
 
Adaptation has been neglected for a long time as it does not, by definition, address 
mitigation. Many scientists and policy makers seem to assume that we should prevent 
radiative forcing from happening instead of dealing with the consequences (Pielke et al. 
2007). But global temperatures have been increasing already, and climate impacts are 
manifesting themselves. Impacts vary regionally and locally, and adaptation measures need 
to be taken accordingly. If mitigation efforts are not introduced timely and at the necessary 
level, such adaptation efforts will have to be accelerated.  
 
The contribution of agriculture to climate change is recognized in the call for lifestyle 
changes such as adopting vegetarian or vegan diets. While they could make a reduction in 
climate forcing they are not enough to change the overall picture (McMichael et al. 2007). 
These are unlikely become dominant voluntarily in a short time span; they will be rejected if 
imposed.  
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Restrictions on population growth poses all sorts of ethical and political problems. While it is 
true that more people on the planet will have a greater impact on the natural environment, 
and increase drivers of climate change, there are various ways in achieving people’s needs 
and desires. When focussing on carbon dioxide as a driver, the carbon intensity of the 
energy used to produce goods and services seems crucial, as expressed in the Kaya Identity 
(Lima et al. 2016; Raftery et al. 2017; Raupach et al. 2007). 
 
It is true that capitalist societies have an in-built mechanism that leads to increasing 
economic activity, with potential harm to the environment in general (Klein 2014). Actors 
who decide to make energy related savings, or decide to have fewer children, will invest 
these savings in the hope to increase returns on investment. However, such investments 
will go into areas that are likely to have impacts on climate (Wapner and Willoughby 2005). 
Nevertheless, the task of abolishing capitalism is even more demanding (or unlikely) 
compared to the task of mitigating climate change. Many on the political left see the fight 
against climate change, and the fight for political reform of capitalism, as equally important, 
and interlinked. However, using climate change as political ‘wedge’ could be politically 
counterproductive. Developing successful mitigation strategies requires the support of 
broad parts of the electorate. Polarization has been a problem in this regard (Kahan et al. 
2012). 
 
Finally, the hope is that authoritarian regimes are more efficient modes of planning a low 
carbon economy (Beeson 2010). But their disregard for citizen’s rights, human rights and 
democratic participation is legend, as is their even worse record in matters environmentally 
(Stehr 2015). The argument has a rational kernel however in that more veto points in a 
political system will slow down decisions (Tsebelis 2002). But democracy as a system is more 
flexible in the long run, which is what we need with climate change. Decisions taken today 
may turn out problematic tomorrow. The electorate needs to be supportive of the route 
taken.  Authoritarian regimes might have an advantage only under the assumption that they 
hit upon the ‘best solution’ (whatever that may mean, given the above caveats) and carry it 
through, with minimal undesirable side-effects (again, a highly problematic assumption). In 
the long run the inevitable popular resistance against authoritarian rulers will lead to 
political upheaval and instability. 
 
As this discussion shows, there is no agreement between the proposed policies. Instead, the 
political arena harbours controversies about all, or most of them. There is no prospect that 
a scientific advisory process could solve these controversies. 
 
How can we deal more effectively with climate change, given the complexities listed above? 
I have argued that climate change as a wicked problem resists a solution. There is no 
obvious stopping rule for climate policies. An alternative is, of course, to separate different 
aspects of the problem and deal with them separately. This is what we observe in day-to-
day politics. Decomposing the large climate problem into many smaller problems could be 
tantamount to transforming the wicked problem of climate change into a number of tame 
problems. The advantage is that we can establish for each of those metrics and success 
criteria, given specific timescales. For example, one could address industrial sectors such as 
cement or steel making, electricity, different agricultural sectors, and so on. Progress can be 
monitored and enhanced in jurisdictions that have the power to do so. However, co-
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ordinating these manifold activities on a national and global level will be a challenge, given 
that such solutions will not only be different across industrial sectors and human activities, 
but also across national jurisdictions. The overall narrative of solving the problem of climate 
change through global climate policy will lose its meaning as a myriad of disconnected 
activities mushrooms across the globe. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Comparing the cases of ozone layer protection and climate change we have identified some 
similarities. These pale in comparison to the differences which have to do with the different 
problem structure of both issues. Ozone depleting substances could be dealt with in a 
process where scientific definitions and metrics led to a technical solution that was 
economically palatable to the main stakeholders. The issue was discussed at a relatively low 
level of public involvement, it was quickly addressed, and it was solved within a reasonable 
timeframe. I explain this success through the fact that the problem was a tame problem. In 
as far as it relies on scientific models and theories that could still be proven wrong, a less 
than full recovery of the ozone layer might lead to an unravelling of the problem, making it 
wicked. 
 
Climate change, by contrast, resists such an approach. There is no unique solution and the 
problem is intractable. Many practical steps can be taken towards partial solutions, but 
these differ in nature and time. What would count as success, at what point in time, is 
unclear. So far science has not been able to provide certainty with regard to two important 
metrics for policy making: climate sensitivity and carbon budgets.  This type of uncertainty is 
well known from other wicked problems, which have been defined as social problems, or 
problems of planning (Rittel and Webber 1973). 
 
Because the two problems are so different, we should abandon loose talk about ‘learning 
from Montreal.’ Instead, we should focus the attention on the practical steps that are 
possible to address climate change, in a process where political compromise and practical 
effectiveness are the hallmarks. ‘Muddling through’ in the search for pragmatic solutions is 
the name of the game (Lindblom 1959; Verweij et al. 2006). 
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